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Abstract. Nowadays, Internet of Things (IoT) is a trending topic in the computing world. No-
tably, IoT devices have strict design requirements and are often referred to as constrained devices.
Therefore, security techniques and primitives that are lightweight are more suitable for such de-
vices, e.g., Static Random-Access Memory (SRAM) Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). SRAM PUF is an intrinsic security primitive that is seeing
widespread adoption in the IoT segment. ECC is a public-key algorithm technique that has been
gaining popularity among constrained IoT devices. The popularity is due to using significantly
smaller operands when compared to other public-key techniques such as RSA (Rivest Shamir
Adleman). This paper shows the design, development, and evaluation of an application-specific
secure communication architecture based on SRAM PUF technology and ECC for constrained
IoT devices. More specifically, it introduces an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) public-key
based cryptographic protocol that utilizes PUF-derived keys as the root-of-trust for silicon au-
thentication. Also, it proposes a design of a modular hardware architecture that supports the
protocol. Finally, to analyze the practicality as well as the feasibility of the proposed protocol, we
demonstrate the solution by prototyping and verifying a protocol variant on the commercial Xilinx
Zynq-7000 APSoC device.
1 Introduction
Secure communication has been paramount throughout history [1]. Although in the
early ages it was mainly found in niche applications such as the military and royal
society, today it is an inevitable part of our daily lives. The recent rapid proliferation
of IoT, a diverse set of devices that are connected to the Internet, imposes new
challenges for the designers to keep protecting our privacy, security, and safety
[2]. Today, the design of use-case specific solutions and its time-to-market are the
biggest challenges in this competitive and rapidly developing IoT semiconductor
industry, where developers rely on ad-hoc security solutions. Therefore, there is an
urgent need to create cost-effective secure solutions with a short-time development,
which are an important facilitator in the IoT market.
Although there is a lot of work published to address the above issues, it mainly
focuses on individual aspects such as protocol design or implementations. One of
the first works in this field was in 2004 by Lee et al. [3] who showed that individ-
ual Integrated Circuits (ICs) can be identified and authenticated using Physical
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Unclonable Functions (PUFs). Later, publications such as [4] described a low-cost
authentication protocol of individual ICs using PUF. However, that protocol is
basic and is not suitable with so-called weak PUFs [5]. More authentication pro-
tocols came after that such as in [6], [7], [8] and [9] and a more recent in [10].
Only a few publications that combine both authentication protocols using PUFs
and lightweight cost-effective implementations exist in the literature such as [11];
the authors developed a lightweight Application-specific Instruction Set Proces-
sor (ASIP) that supports certain existing authentication protocols based on reverse
fuzzy extractor (RFE) constructions, rather than reusing existing components. Still,
most works typically address the aspects of the authentication protocol but do not
address cost-effectiveness and/or time to market aspects. A solution that satisfies
all the requirements is still needed.
In this work, we focus on developing a cryptographic protocol based on Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) that enables efficient hardware design by reusing
readily-available components for an efficient and fast time-to-market design. In
that regard, we designed and developed an efficient and cost-effective solution. In
short, the contributions of this paper are:
– A protocol that enables secure communication between constrained devices and
a resource-rich party in untrusted fields, and using PUF-derived keys as the
root-of-trust. The protocol is based on a conventional ECDH key agreement
scheme and a fuzzy extractor using code-offset method for accommodating a
PUF.
– A modular hardware architecture where the key components are implemented
in hardware while minimizing the impact on the silicon footprint. Here we em-
phasize on the fact that readily-available off-the-shelf components such as the
NaCl core [12] can be used to speed up the development cycle. The core can
be used to perform elliptic curve scalar multiplications on a patent-free elliptic
curve - Curve25519 [13], offering 128 bits of security.
– A proof of concept based on a Zynq board to demonstrate how such a solution
can be quickly prototyped using ‘off-the-shelf’ components.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background
information. Section 3 discusses protocol design for our intended application; we
propose a total of four variants of this protocol, each with its own pros and cons.
Section 4 presents a modular hardware architecture design that supports the pro-
tocol. Section 5 gives the proof of concept used for validation. Finally, Section 6
provides the conclusion.
2 Background
In this section, we provide a brief background on the working principle of an SRAM-
PUF that we use in our work for silicon authentication.
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Fig. 1: Conceptual schematic of a 6T SRAM cell
The concept of PUFs was first introduced by Pappu [14] in 2001 as a hardware
security primitive that can be used for silicon authentication. Later, Maes [15]
extended this concept to ‘expression of an inherent and unclonable instance-specific
feature of a physical object.’ In essence, PUFs are functions that take challenges as
an input and generate responses that are random but unique for a specific device
[16]. Using PUFs, it is possible to create a stable, unique, and device-dependent
fingerprint, which can be used as a secret key or a unique device identifier [17], [18].
Therefore, PUFs are applied in several applications such as anti-counterfeiting,
device authentication, and hardware/software binding applications [18].
There is a broad taxonomy of PUFs today, such as delay-based arbiter PUFs and
ring oscillator PUFs, memory-based SRAM PUFs, and butterfly PUFs [19]. SRAM
PUFs are of particular interest to the industry compared to other types of PUFs;
Integration of SRAMs in the modern systems do not require special manufacturing
techniques since SRAMs can be synthesized using standard cells. Furthermore,
they are readily available in most existing systems. SRAM PUF is a memory-based
PUF construction that uses intrinsic random start-up cell values to create challenge
pair responses [20]. SRAM is a standard cell component that is composed of 6
transistors. Figure 1 shows a typical six transistor SRAM cell design, consisting of
two cross-coupled Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) inverters
using four transistors M1 through M4. Transistors M5 and M6 are known as the
pass transistors. The wordline (WL), bitline (BL), and its complement are used
to access the cell. For performance reasons, the two inverters in the SRAM cell
are designed in a well-balanced, symmetrical way. However, the small and random
sub-micron process variations in the manufacturing process cause different physical
properties of the transistors. These differences in the transistors of the SRAM cell
causes a skew. Due to this skew, a cell acquires a preferred state of a logic ‘0’ or
a logic ‘1’ when powered on, referred to as one bit of ‘electronic’ fingerprint. This
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phenomenon of inherent, device-unique variations makes SRAM PUFs construction
possible [19]. It is resistant to cloning even if one can get their hands on the circuit
design/layout files since the skew is not visible in the layout. With the current
manufacturing process variations are inevitable and cannot be controlled; therefore,
cloning an SRAM PUF yields to be tough or even impossible [15]. Every SRAM
cell upon power-up can provide one bit of such electronic fingerprint. Hence, arrays
of uninitialized SRAM cells can be used to identify devices, securely store, and
generate cryptographic keys on devices.
In this work, we use SRAM PUF-derived secret key as the hardware root-of-
trust in authenticating constrained IoT devices in the field. Note that each time the
key must be reliably extracted. Techniques such as entropy extraction and error-
correcting codes are used to achieve this [17].
3 Protocol Design
In this section, we show how a secure protocol can be efficiently composed for
an IoT application. First, we describe what confidentiality and authentication are,
and then provide a realistic use case. After that, we present the main protocol
and variants thereof. Finally, we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the
proposed protocols.
Confidentiality and authentication are some of the core criteria of a secure sys-
tem [21]. Confidentiality is a service used to keep the information accessible only
to authorized users. Authentication is a service that verifies the identity of users
or entities and therefore ensures that its data or the entity can be trusted. In or-
der to achieve confidentiality and authentication between devices, one may employ
authenticated encryption techniques. However, before establishing an encrypted
channel, communicating parties must share the same key. Due to the key distri-
bution problem [22], key exchange protocols have emerged. Using a key exchange
(key-agreement) protocol, involved parties agree on a shared secret key in such a
way that all parties influence the outcome, without transferring the actual key itself
over an untrusted channel. Key-agreement protocols rely on the exchange of au-
thentic public-key components of the involved parties, i.e., keys that truly belong,
therefore prove the identity of claimed users or entities. Next, we present a use case
where a key-agreement protocol is used to achieve this.
3.1 Use Case
The use case under consideration in this paper is illustrated in Figure 2; a resource-
rich server communicates with constrained IoT devices in an untrusted field. The
two fundamental assumptions about this untrusted field are that the communication
is susceptible to both passive and active attacks because there is very little or
no control over it. In a passive attack, an intruder can only eavesdrop on the
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Fig. 2: Use-case scenario
communication. In an active attack, an intruder may also transmit, replay, modify
or delete specific communication messages. We see that there are two types of
devices: legitimate and malicious. The latter should not be authenticated. The
need for secure communication in this use case is, therefore, obvious.
3.2 Protocol Description
As pointed out in the background section, establishing secure communication be-
tween a device and a server requires a secure protocol. The goal of the protocol is to
derive shared keys between the server and legitimate devices in the field, therefore,
enabling an authenticated and encrypted communication. We will briefly look at
four slightly different scenarios with different requirements that result in protocol
modifications and discuss their advantages/disadvantages. In all the scenarios, the
communication is to be established between a server and a device enrollment. By
using a Trusted Third Party (TTP), we add substantial flexibility due to the Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) and therefore inherit the benefit of certificate manage-
ment, e.g., device’s certificate revocation, etc. The four scenarios are:
– Scenario 1: we wish to achieve mutual authentication and certificate manage-
ment, and use as little Non-volatile Memory (NVM) as possible on the device.
To achieve mutual authentication, the server and devices need to be enrolled by
a TTP. To reduce NVM requirement and improve certificate management, cloud
infrastructure is used. The cloud infrastructure is a database that is meant to be
accessible by the TTP and the server for storing and retrieving digital certificates
of the enrolled devices, respectively.
– Scenario 2: Therefore, similarly as in scenario 1, both parties are enrolled by a
TTP; however, cloud infrastructure is not used here.
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– Scenario 3: we wish to achieve one-way authentication (which could be sufficient
in some instances) and certificate management, and again use as little as possible
of device’s NVM. To achieve this, only the devices are enrolled by the TTP, and
cloud infrastructure is used.
– Scenario 4: we loosen up all the constraints, i.e., one-way authentication, no
reduced NVM requirement, and no certificate management is required. Clearly,
this is the minimal version of the protocol, requiring only the enrollment of the
devices and no cloud infrastructure.
For each of the scenarios, we present four different protocol variants, referred
to as Protocol A, B, C, and D, respectively. In the rest of the section, we focus on
protocol Variant A that satisfies the most demanding Scenario 1 in detail, shown
in Protocol 1.1. Other protocol variants are briefly explained afterward.
Variant A: The protocol is divided into two stages. In the first stage, the device is
enrolled by a Trusted Third Party (TTP) in a secure environment. This is typically
done only once during the life-cycle of a device. The second stage, key-agreement,
and authentication, takes place in the field whenever necessary, i.e., communicating
parties establish a shared key before communication. Table 1 provides the legend
for the protocols used in this paper. Furthermore, other notations, followed by a
detailed description of Protocol 1.1 are described below:
Table 1: Protocol Legend
Symbol Description Symbol Description
ID Device ID, 48 bits SKTTP TTP’s secret key, 256 bits
PKTTP TTP’s public key, 256 bits x PUF-based secret key, 256 bits
HD Helper data, 752 bytes PKID Device’s Public Key, 256 bits
σID Digital signature, 256 bits SKserver Server’s secret key, 256 bits
PKserver Server’s public key, 256 bits w, k Shared secret and key, 256 bits
CertID Device’s Certificate CertIDserver Certificate
∗ Scalar multiplication KDF () Key Derivation Function
V f Signature Verification
PUF-enroll: generates a (PUF-derived) cryptographically secure key x and helper
data HD that is used in the decoding stage of the key reconstruction in the field.
PUF-reconstruct: is the reconstruction process of the secure key x that was enrolled
earlier.
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(I) Enrollment of the device and the server
Trusted Third Party (TTP) has SKTTP Device (ID)
1 : (x, HD) ← PUF − enroll
2 : PKID ← DH KGen(x)
3 : ID,HD,PKID
4 : σID ← SigskTTP (ID,HD,PKID)
5 : CertID = [ID,HD,PKID, σID]
6 : Store(CertID) in cloud
7 : PKTTP
8 : Store(PKTTP )
Trusted Third Party (TTP) has SKTTP Server (ID)
9 : (SKserver, PKserver)← DH KGen
10 : ID, PKserver
11 : σID ← SigskTTP (ID, PKserver)
12 : CertIDserver = [ID, PKID, σID]
13 : CertIDserver , PKTTP
14 : Store(CertIDserver , SKserver, PKTTP )
(II) Key-agreement and Authentication
Server has PKTTP and access to cloud Device (ID) has PKTTP
15 : Retrieve(CertID) from cloud
16 : VfpkTTP (CertID)
17 : Session request, HD, CertIDserver
18 : VfpkTTP (CertIDserver)
19 : x ← PUF − reconstruct(HD)
20 : w = SKserver ∗ PKID 21 : w = x ∗ PKserver
22 : k = KDF (w) k = KDF (w)
23 : Challenge-response handshake in both directions
Protocol 1.1: Protocol based on Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (DHKE) using
Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)-derived key. Variant A - Achieving mutual-
authentication and low Non-volatile Memory (NVM) requirement using the cloud
infrastructure.
DH KGen(x): calculates the public key based on the private key x. In ECC, it
corresponds to a scalar multiplication (*) of the scalar x and the base point of a
particular elliptic curve as per curve’s specifications.
KDF(): is a Key Derivation Function that should be used to derive a quality secret
key from a shared secret [23].
ID: is an identification number unique to a device.
(I) Enrollment All IoT devices must first be enrolled with a TTP before their
operation in the field. The enrollment phase happens as follows:
Step 1: Device’s PUF response is enrolled, and the key-generation subsystem gen-
erates a cryptographic key x, along with Helper Data (HD). The HD is required
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to reconstruct the private key x from the same PUF device in later stages. This is
explained in more detail in Section 4.
Step 2: The generated key x is used to calculate its corresponding public key. This
computation is performed using scalar multiplication in a suitable elliptic curve
group, the result of which is a point on the curve. Note that in general, depending
on the cryptosystem, x may not be directly used as a private key. A post-processing
step may be needed.
Step 3: The device sends its identifier ID, HD and the computed public key to the
TTP.
Step 4-5: The TTP signs the received data using its private key and generates a
certificate.
Step 6: TTP stores the device’s certificate to a cloud. The certificate binds the
device’s ID to its PUF based public key.
Step 7-8: The device must be able to verify the identity of the server it is trying to
communicate within the field by verifying its certificate. Therefore, an additional
step in device enrollment is sending and storing the TTP’s public key PKTTP
on the device. To guarantee the security of this protocol, this key must be stored
securely on the device, i.e., it cannot be tampered with. Failing to do so allows
malicious servers to masquerade as a trusted one.
Step 9-14: In order to achieve mutual authentication, the server needs to be enrolled
by a TTP similarly as the device; a digital certificate is issued to the server.
(II) Key-agreement and Authentication In the field, the device must be
able to establish a secure and authenticated communication with the server.
Step 15-16: The server retrieves the certificate of the desired device from the cloud
and verifies it.
Step 17: The server initiates communication by sending a session request message,
HD of the device, and the certificate to the device for verification.
Step 18: The device verifies server’s certificate using PKTTP .
Step 19: The device reconstructs the PUF-based private key x using the received
HD.
Step 20-21: Both parties have the required information to calculate the shared
secret w using scalar multiplication.
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Step 22: A Key Derivation Function is used for privacy-enhancing purposes to
derive a cryptographically secure shared key on both sides.
Step 23: A challenge-response handshake in both directions is necessary to make
sure that the calculated shared keys on both sides are equivalent.
3.3 Other Variants
Alternatively, if one wishes to have simpler protocol variants (Scenarios 2-4), i.e., no
cloud infrastructure or simply only one-way authentication, one may use a simpler
protocol. In this subsection, we present three variants with different complexities;
similarly to Variant A, all of them are divided into two stages.
Variant B: This protocol variant, shown in Protocol 1.2, accommodates Scenario
2; therefore, it does not require a cloud infrastructure, while still having mutual
authentication. The cloud infrastructure is removed in this variant. The certificate
that is generated in Step 5 is transmitted to and stored on the device itself, therefore
requiring more NVM storage space. Instead of Step 15, upon a session request, the
device sends its previously-stored certificate to the server.
Variant C: This protocol variant, shown in Protocol 1.3, accommodates Scenario
3, therefore, mutual authentication is removed, i.e., Steps 7 - 14 are omitted. This
protocol uses cloud infrastructure to reduce the NVM storage requirement on the
device and provides certificate management. Step 17 is modified, and Step 18 is
removed since no server certificates are involved. The server fetches and verifies
the certificate from the cloud, generates an ephemeral DH key-pair, and sends its
contribution (PKserver) to the device. At this point, both parties can start the
key generation process, as seen in Steps 19-23 of Variant A. Note that a challenge-
response handshake in one direction is sufficient here.
Variant D: This protocol variant, shown in Protocol 1.4, accommodates Scenario
4, therefore is the simplest variant of the protocols. In this variant, only the device is
enrolled, and the certificate that is generated in Step 5 is transmitted to and stored
on the device itself. Therefore, Steps 6-16 are omitted. Steps 17-18 are modified
as follows; upon a session request, the device sends the certificate back that was
stored on the device during enrollment. The server verifies the certificate, generates
an ephemeral DH key-pair, and sends its contribution (PKserver) to the device. At
this point, both parties can start the key generation process, as seen in Steps 19-23
of Variant A. Note that a challenge-response handshake in one direction is sufficient
in this case.
3.4 Protocol Evaluation
The fundamental security of the proposed protocols relies on the fact that they
are built based on the well known ECDH protocol. That said, several assumptions
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(I) Enrollment of the device and the server
Trusted Third Party (TTP) has SKTTP Device (ID)
1 : (x, HD) ← PUF − enroll
2 : PKIDS ← DH KGen(x)
3 : ID,HD,PKIDS
4 : σID ← SigskTTP (ID,HD,PKIDS )
5 : CertIDS = [ID,HD,PKIDS , σID]
6 : CertIDS , PKTTP
7 : Store(CertIDS , PKTTP )
Trusted Third Party (TTP) has SKTTP Server (ID)
8 : (SKserver, PKserver)← DH KGen
9 : ID, PKserver
10 : σID ← SigskTTP (ID, PKserver)
11 : CertIDserver = [ID, PKID, σID]
12 : CertIDserver , PKTTP
13 : Store(CertIDserver , SKserver, PKTTP )
(II) Key-agreement and Authentication
Server has PKTTP Device (ID) has PKTTP
14 : Session request, CertIDserver
15 : VfpkTTP (CertIDserver )
16 : CertIDS = [ID,HD,PKID, σID]
17 : VfpkTTP (CertIDS ) 18 : x ← PUF − reconstruct(HD)
19 : w = SKserver ∗ PKIDS 20 : w = x ∗ PKserver
21 : k = KDF (w) k = KDF (w)
22 : Challenge-response handshake in both directions
Protocol 1.2: Protocol based on DHKE using PUF-derived key. Variant B - Mutual-
authentication and no cloud infrastructure.
need to be in place to guarantee security. Firstly, we assume that TTP is indeed
trusted and that SKTTP is well protected. Secondly, in Protocols A and B, the
storage of TTP’s public key PKTTP on the device must be secure. Although PKTTP
is public information, it must not be tampered; if tampered, the security would
be compromised, i.e., a malicious server would be able to communicate with the
device. Lastly, storing the device certificate CertID on the device or in the cloud
does not need to be that secure, because CertID is public information. Stealing
its contents will not give any advantage to anyone. However, modifying it would
render it useless, and could be used to perform a denial of service attack on the
device, which is why secure storage is still recommended.
Although the differences between the protocol variants are slight changes, the
results in terms of communication performance, functionality, etc. can be signifi-
cantly different, as we will see. The main properties of the protocol variants A-D
are summarized in Table 2. Options/properties with (+) are desired, whereas (-)
are not. From the table, we see that in all protocol variants, authenticate the de-
10
(I) Enrollment of the Device
Trusted Third Party (TTP) has SKTTP Device (ID)
1 : (x, HD) ← PUF − enroll
2 : PKID ← DH KGen(x)
3 : ID,HD,PKID
4 : σID ← SigskTTP (ID,HD,PKID)
5 : CertID = [ID,HD,PKID, σID]
6 : Store(CertID) in cloud
(II) Key-agreement and Authentication
Server has PKTTP and access to cloud storage Device (ID)
7 : Retrieve(CertID) from cloud
8 : Session request, HD
9 : VfpkTTP (CertID) 10 : x ← PUF − reconstruct(HD)
11 : (SKHP , PKHP )← Ephemeral DH KGen
12 : PKHP
13 : w = SKHP ∗ PKID 14 : w = x ∗ PKHP
15 : k = KDF (w) k = KDF (w)
16 : Challenge-response handshake in one directions
Protocol 1.3: Protocol based on DHKE using PUF-derived key. Variant C - Device
authentication and using cloud infrustructure.
vice, whereas only Variants A and B authenticate the server as well. The NVM
requirement is discussed later in more detail. Another important point to note is
that Variants C and D generate ephemeral DH key-pairs, i.e., two same parties
will set up new keys for every session, a property that is desired. Alas, protocol
Variants A and B do not possess this quality anymore because the signed long term
keys are used in the DH handshake. A quick fix for that would be to generate an
ephemeral DH key-pair for the session and use the long-term signed key to sign the
new ephemeral key. The device will then have to verify this signature. Table 3 shows
some basic properties of the protocol variants such as the number of transfers, data
transfer size, and the NVM requirement to perform the enrollment, key-agreement,
and authentication. Note that the numbers are based on the following realistic con-
siderations. The size of ID is chosen to be identical to the size of a Media Access
Control address (IEEE Standard), which is 48 bits. A key with 256 bits of entropy
needs approximately 720 bytes of SRAM and 752 bytes of HD based on one of the
specific implementations of Intrinsic-ID Quiddikey PUF technology. Moreover, the
following analysis is focused more on the device side and the interactions with the
device due to its constrained nature.
The Number of Transfers shows the number of message transactions during
enrollment and in the field. As we can see, Variant B has the most data transfers,
whereas Variant C has the least. However, the difference is mainly in the enrollment
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(I) Enrollment of the Device
Trusted Third Party (TTP) has SKTTP Device (ID)
1 : (x, HD) ← PUF − enroll
2 : PKID ← DH KGen(x)
3 : ID,HD,PKID
4 : σID ← SigskTTP (ID,HD,PKID)
5 : CertID = [ID,HD,PKID, σID]
6 : CertID
7 : Store(CertID)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Device enrollment complete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(II) Key-agreement and Authentication
Server has PKTTP Device (ID)
8 : Session request
9 : CertID = [ID,HD,PKID, σID]
10 : VfpkTTP (CertID) 11 : x ← PUF − reconstruct(HD)
12 : (SKHP , PKHP )← Ephemeral DH KGen
13 : PKHP
14 : w = SKHP ∗ PKID 15 : w = x ∗ PKHP
16 : k = KDF (w) k = KDF (w)
17 : Challenge-response handshake in one directions
Protocol 1.4: Protocol based on DHKE using PUF-derived key. Variant D - Device
authentication and no cloud infrustructure.
phase and not during operation; hence, the performance during run-time is similar
between them.
The Data Transfer Size shows the size of the messages in bits needed to be com-
municated during the transactions. This metric is essential for constrained devices
because every bit sent consumes power. Interestingly, all protocol variants transfer
more or less the same amount of data.
The NVM Requirement shows how much data need to be ‘permanently’ stored
on the device. Variant B requires the most since it needs to store the certificate as
well as the TTP’s public key, whereas Variant C requires no storage.
4 Architecture Design
In the previous section, a key-exchange protocol based on Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman (ECDH) and Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)-derived key has been
proposed along with several protocol variants. In this section, we design a template
of a hardware architecture that enables these protocols on a constrained IoT device.
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Variant A + + negligible (+) required (+/-) online (+) required (–)
Variant B + + large (–) offline (+/-) required (–)
Variant C + - none (++) required (+/-) online (+)
Variant D + - large (–) offline (+/-)
The template contains vital components that are necessary to secure the applica-
tion. The template enables a quick design of high-level hardware architecture. After
that, we present this high-level system architecture and the components that it is
comprised of, followed by a proof-of-concept validation in the next section.
The constrained device must include a minimal set of primitives as elaborated
below and shown in Figure 3:
Control unit: A control unit is essential to orchestrate all components and inter-
face with the outside world. For example, the control unit can be a micro-program
that implements the protocol and handles the interface to the outside.
ECC Scalar Multiplication unit: The protocols are based on ECDH; hence,
scalar multiplication operation ∗ is used on the device both during enrollment and
in the field. The scalar multiplication is the most compute-intensive operation in
ECC.
PUF System: The protocol is based on PUF-derived keys, i.e., PUF-technology
is used for silicon authentication. The selected PUF is an SRAM-PUF due to its
availability in most systems. The following are the integral parts of the SRAM-PUF
system:
– SRAM: For an SRAM PUF, a block of uninitialized SRAM must be available
in the system.
– Fuzzy Extractor: SRAM start-up values are typically noisy, mostly due to en-
vironmental factors, e.g., temperature variation. To compensate for this noise,
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Table 3: Properties of Protocol Variants A-D
Variant A Variant B Variant C Variant D
Number of Transfers
Stage I 4 4 1 2
Stage II 4 5 4 5
Total: 8 9 5 7
Data Transfer Size in bits (with device only)
Stage I 6576 6832 6320 6576
Stage II 6736 7296 6368 6928
Total: 13312 14128 12688 13504
NVM Requirement (device) 256 6832 0 6576
{PKttp} {Certid} {PKttp} {Certid}
a fuzzy extractor is used for a reliable and stable secure-key reconstruction
[24,25,26]. A detailed description of a fuzzy extractor, alongside its security or
reliability evaluation, is outside the scope of this work. For the sake of proof of
concept, we use the simple code offset method, which constitutes of two phases,
enrollment and reconstruction. During enrollment, Helper Data (HD) HD is cal-
culated as HD = R ⊕ C = R ⊕ Encode(S), where R is the initial PUF response
and C is the code, which is the result of an encoded secret key S. During recon-
struction, the noisy PUF response R′ is read out and the noisy code C ′ is recon-
structed using C ′ = R′ ⊕ HD = R′ ⊕ (R ⊕ Encode(S)) = noise+Encode(S)
Eventually, the secret key S is obtained by S = Decode(noise + Encode(S))
– Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG): Essentially, SRAM-PUF
is used as a key-storage. During the PUF enrollment stage, a key S must be
supplied to the fuzzy-extractor to be programmed. One such source of a key can
be a PRNG. PRNG needs to be seeded with a TRNG. For that, the noise in the
PUF responses could be used.
The above list represents a minimalist set of components. Optionally, based
on the protocol variant the final design might include additional modules such
as a test unit, Non-volatile Memory (NVM), symmetric crypto unit, and a power
management unit.
5 Proof of Concept
In this section we present the proof of concept that is used for validation as well as
a discussion.
In order to demonstrate the practicality of the proposed protocol, we build
a prototype using off-the-shelf components that satisfies all requirements. As a
prototyping platform, we choose the Xilinx Zynq-7000 family All Programmable
System on Chip (APSoC) device. This platform hosts a General Purpose Processor
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Fig. 3: Conceptual Hardware Architecture
(GPP) and an Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). This gives the flexibility
to design and develop both hardware, software, and hardware/software co-design
paradigms. For this prototype, we selected the NaCl core [12] to implement the
scalar multiplication, which is one of the key operations in the DHKE protocol.
NaCl Crypto box in Hardware - which we will refer to as “NaCl core” or sim-
ply “NaCl”- is an example of low-resource hardware implementation of the widely
known crypto box function of the ‘Networking and Cryptography library’ (NaCl)
[12]. The NaCl core is in the public domain, making it worthwhile to use. NaCl
uses Curve25519 elliptic curve, which is supported by the popular OpenSSL library
and is included in the TLS 1.3 [27]. This is the only low-resource hardware imple-
mentation of Curve25519 to our knowledge. The NaCl core supports the X25519
Diffie-Hellman key exchange using Curve25519, the Salsa20 stream cipher, and the
Poly1305 message authenticator [12]. The NaCl core is implemented as an Applica-
tion Specific Instruction Processor (ASIP), with a silicon area utilization of 14.6k
gate equivalent. It consumes less than 40uW of power consumption at a 1MHz fre-
quency for a 130nm low-leakage CMOS process technology [12]. There are several
reasons why this particular core is chosen. Firstly, it is a technology independent
hardware implementation targeting highly resource-constrained devices i.e., opti-
mized for area. Secondly, the VHDL code of the core is in the public domain and,
therefore, freely available for the public. This allows us to modify it to fit our needs.
Moreover, by using the NaCl core, we build on top of previous academic work and
reduce development time.
The performance of the NaCl core mainly depends on the configuration of the
multiplier. The fastest two-cycle version of the core utilizes 2754 LUT Slices on a
Xilinx Artix R©-7 FPGA and takes approximately 830882 cycles for scalar multipli-
cation. However, in order to have the smallest possible area utilization, we configure
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Fig. 4: Server GUI; used to enroll, authenticate and provide the output of the device.
the NaCl core to use a 16 cycle multiplier at the cost of time [12]. Furthermore,
the original core contains other functionalities such as the XSalsa20 and Poly1308
code [12], compiled and stored in the ROM program that we do not need for this
work. By reducing the program to its minimum, we further reduced the ROM size
by approximately a factor of two. By doing all this, the final NaCl configuration
takes 3.475.123 cycles and has the lowest area utilization of 946 LUT Slices on our
prototyping platform.
The Xilinx Zynq APSoC platform tightly couples a processor together with
the fabric, and the communication is possible via the AXI-peripheral. In order to
integrate the NaCl core into our prototype setup, we must first wrap the NaCl core
into an AXI-peripheral. Secondly, create hardware interface drivers to abstract the
hardware and expose only the high-level operations to the programmer.
5.1 Validation
The essential components needed for all the protocol variants are the same. There-
fore, to validate the protocols, we choose to emulate Protocol D on the platform de-
scribed above, due to its simplicity. We used a server to perform the key-agreement
authentication protocol without the device. To simplify the verification process, a
GUI has been developed that executes the protocol steps. A screenshot of this GUI
is provided in Figure 4. At the end of the emulation, we verified that both parties
(i.e. device and server) derived the same key. Furthermore, in order to emulate ma-
licious behavior in our prototyping setup, we replaced the authentic SRAM by one
that has not been enrolled. Our experiment showed that we could identify malicious
devices and deny their access.
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5.2 Discussion
In this section, we discuss how this solution satisfies the requirements, as well as
its limitations.
Mutual authentication key-agreement protocol - One of the require-
ments was to enable secure communication between resource-constrained and un-
constrained IoT devices and provide mutual authentication. Moreover, by using
PUF derived keys on the IoT devices, we authenticate silicon. Hence, an Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) based protocol was designed using the PUF-derived
key. The protocol achieves mutual authentication. Furthermore, by using a cloud
infrastructure, we achieve certificate management that can be used to blacklist de-
vices easily. Alternatively, based on a particular need, one can choose from three
additional protocol variants.
Fast time to market - We present a generic hardware architecture template
that can be used in conjunction with the proposed protocols. The critical component
in the entire system is scalar multiplication. We show that an off-the-shelf core
such as NaCl can be quickly used for such purposes. Furthermore, this has the
potential to be a viable option for a low to medium production, and a fast time
to market, which is crucial in the IoT market. Alternatively, if a higher production
volume is required, we might need to design an ASIC. Although the non-recurring
costs are known to be high for such design, the resulting per-unit price can be
substantially minimized this way. Furthermore, ASIC design can be optimized for
an area, resulting in the smallest form factor.
Minimizing silicon footprint - To minimize the footprint, we use ECC. Due
to its shorter operands, area utilization is significantly reduced when compared to
other public-key crypto cores, while achieving the same level of security. Therefore,
ECC has been gaining popularity in the community as a suitable candidate for
constrained devices. Furthermore, to minimize the silicon footprint of our design, we
choose to use SRAM-PUF. SRAM is already present in most systems, and SRAM
can be made from standards components. Furthermore, SRAM-PUF technology
itself is gaining popularity, and its widespread adoption is imminent.
Validation - In this work, we introduced a systematic approach to building a
prototype for the validation of our proposed protocol. The prototype allowed us to
verify, evaluate, and analyze the feasibility of such a system.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a mutual authenticating key-agreement protocol that
is based on ECDH which uses a SRAM-PUF based key. The proposed protocol is
designed for IoT devices that work under stringent constraints, i.e., area, cost and
power. We chose ECDH since ECC is a suitable candidate for constrained devices
due to the shorter operand size. Also, SRAM-PUF is chosen to be used due to its
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expected adoption in IoT. In our base protocol, communicating parties are enrolled
by a TTP to achieve mutual authentication with a negligible NVM requirement
on the device’s side. Furthermore, we use cloud infrastructure to make certificate
management possible. In order to comply with different scenarios, three additional
variants of the original protocol are proposed. We further provide a comparison
of the variants, showing the trade-offs related to security versus implementation
requirements. As future work, we expect to carry out formal security verification of
the proposed protocol and its variants. The designed protocol served as a roadmap
in drafting a modular hardware architecture. This architecture was prototyped,
verified, and its feasibility and practicality were demonstrated on a Xilinx Zynq-
7000 APSoC device.
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